The following is a case filed by Robert Hedges against a recent dupe in the matter of educational and career interference. The Professor herein not named was a recent arrival at UnivLou and was not recalled to teach legal writing. This event is in the 1994 chapter, but is not the basis for the continuous future damage, because this case allowed me to contact all the witnesses and set the record streight. The lurker will notice that the damage was limited to a small nominal amount because the earlier slanders were the greatest damage to Robert.

This case is a model which any student who is similarly harmed may wish to examine. You may determine if a case properly presented will remedy the injury.

The Defendant denied making such a statement, and threatened countersuit for emotional distress and statute tort of outrage. Witnesses are required to prove slanders. Every event which preceded this event involving slanders toward Robert lacked willing witnesses, or disposable income to use as legal fees, or knowledge of what steps to take to proceed. This event could have been different due to the sheer number of students who were witnesses. This case ended on the motion linked here.

ROBERT H. HEDGES ___________________ PLAINTIFF

V

_________________, ATTY at LAW______________ DEFENDANT

Comes the Plaintiff, ROBERT HEDGES and MAKES COMPLAINT as FOLLOWS:

The facts of the case are : Plaintiff Robert Hedges, was taking a "oral final exam" in Advanced Paralegal Research and Writing Class, # LA 103, on Wednesday, 5 May 1993, [or thereabouts] at the University of Louisville. This "oral final exam" was a class debate by each student reflecting his or her respective assigned position. Plaintiff was before the entire class making his ten minute presentation. Plaintiff's assigned position was as Police Officer Council, seeking a summary dismissal in a 42  1983 false arrest action.

Defendant, Associate Professor _________, during the debate, with no coherent context whatever, said to the Plaintiff Robert Hedges "OK you're GAY". The issue of GAY was nowhere a factor in this final assignment and arose nowhere else during that "oral final exam. Plaintiff Robert Hedges believes that an immediate truthful response in the negative would have broken the mood of the debated issue and such a digression from the topics of the assignment could possibly have effected the grade of to his detriment. Plaintiff did not lose focus of the topic of the debate, nor respond or react during that "oral final exam, " and continued with the assigned debate. Plaintiff cannot determine what effect Defendant Associate Professor _______s' statement had upon the class, or the focus of the debate topic then on trial. The grades were issued some weeks later. The statute of limitations on slander is one year. Plaintiff must take recourse within one year or lose the right the use of the court to adjudicate this slander. If the students in that class take that slanderous statement seriously, and apply it to Plaintiff Robert Hedges, even in the absence of intentional malice on their part, there is the potential for great damage in the life of Plaintiff Robert Hedges at some time in a future career. The purpose of this complaint is to alleviate that character damage.

A Brief reiteration of the facts of the case are :

• 1) The statement was made while Plaintiff was in front of the class.
• 2) The class was the listening attentively due to the importance of the final grade.
• 3) The statement was slanderous per se.
• 4) Character damage is presumed by law to result from slander per se.
• 5) No normal opportunity arose to again encounter this group of students to counter the slander.

[a]llegedly slanderous words are to be taken in the sense in which they would be understood by those who hear them, and they shouldn't be tortured into a charge of guilt nor explained into innocence, contrary to their obvious imports, if a crime is imputed the words are slanderous per se. Jones v Grief, 131 SW2d 487, (Ky 1939)

]a]llegedly libelous words used with reference to another are ordinarily construed in their plain and popular sense. Paducah Newspapers v Wise, 247 SW2d 989 , (Ky 1952) 343 US 942 denied

[a]llegedly defamatory words must be measured by their natural and probative effects on the minds of the average lay reader and not subjected to the critical analysis of the legal mind. Digest Pub Co v Perry Pub Co, 284 SW2d 832 at 834, (Ky 1956); Smith v Pure Oil, 128 SW2d 931 , (Ky 1939); Sweeny & Co v Brown, 60 SW2d 381 , (Ky 1933)

What does the word GAY mean in common usage, such as among the students who compose this class and their peers elsewhere ? [note1] The term GAY in common slang usage means Homosexual and is slanderous per se. What does the word homosexual mean to an educated individual ? Homosexuality is defined as a sexual preference [note2] and implies homoeroticism. [note3]

The law of the case is :

The law in Kentucky was not unclear before the decision in Comm v Wasson, 842 SW2d 487, (Ky 1992). The allegation of homosexuality would simply be slanderous per se due to Kentucky law defining this behavior as a crime.

Edwards v Steele, 36 SW2d 834 , (1931), Jones v Grief, 131 SW2d 487, (Ky 1939) allegation of a crime is slanderous per se - no special damage need be pled or proven

However, in the light of Comm v Wasson, 842 SW2d 487, (Ky 1992), there are new descriptions clarified. Wasson supra states that the constitutional right of privacy protects the homosexual. Therefore Wasson supra says that being homosexual involves a privacy right. Does this mean that the allegation of homosexuality would merely invade a privacy right. ? How does this mesh with the case of Brents v Morgan, 299 SW 967, (Ky 1927) ? The Court said in Brents supra that invasion of privacy results only in mental anguish which cannot be measured by pecuniary standard; truth is a complete defense to libel action; and there is no redress for invasion of privacy by oral publication. Therefore an individual who is really homosexual could not successfully sue a professor for making such a statement before a class. If Plaintiff Robert Hedges were a homosexual [which he is not], and the slander under scrutiny is determined to be an invasion of privacy by oral publication, no redress would be allowed, if the doctrine expressed in Brents supra is applicable based upon these facts in this case ? The homosexual minority is believed to be roughly 13% of the Louisville population, from which we may extrapolate statistically that roughly a comparable percentage of students will be homosexuals. Can any professor be allowed to make such a statement in any class against one of the minority above mentioned. ? We should note here that such statements are potentially a violation of 18 usc 245. which is "[t]he interference with the participation and enjoyment of a federally protected activity, specifically inclusive of college attendance "

There is another legal standard which does not depend upon Wasson supra or invasion of privacy standard however:

[s]tatement subjecting one to hatred, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace or tending to induce an evil opinion of him in minds of right thinking people is actionable per se. Bell c CJ&T, 402 SW2d 84 , (Ky 1966); Digest Pub Co v Perry Pub Co, 284 SW2d 832 , (Ky 1956); Shields v Booles, 38 SW2d 677, (Ky 1931) [note4]

[d]eprive him of friendship, intercourse, and society. Need not imply a crime, impute a violation of law or involve moral turpitude or immoral conduct. Digest Pub Co v Perry Pub Co, 284 SW2d 832 , (Ky 1956)

[d]egrade, disgrace, hold him up to public hatred, contempt or scorn. Digest Pub Co v Perry Pub Co, 284 SW2d 832 , (Ky 1956)

[w]ords are actionable per se when they charge or impute commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, affliction with infectious disease, . . . or having a tendency to prejudice a person in his trade, calling or profession, Hill v Evans, 258 SW2d 917 , (Ky 1953); Shields v Booles, 38 SW2d 677 at 680, (Ky 1931)

[a] charge implying immorality or indecency is character damage which is presumed to have accrued from the wrong done. Shields v Booles, 38 SW2d 677 , (Ky 1931)

[R]eputation can scarcely be assessed except by what people say. Hearsay can be direct proof of such damage and of its effects, such hearsay is not received as the evidence of the truth of what was said, but of evidence of the fact that it had been said; injury to reputation and good will; DuoTherm Div Motor Wheel v Sheergrain, 504 SW2d 689, (Ky 1973)

Fordson Coal v Carter, 108 SW2d 1007, (Ky 1937) basis for action for libel is injury to reputation, hence publication is required - publication is communication to one person

Vanover v Wells, 94 SW2d 999 , (Ky 1936) allegations in presence of diverse persons that police were getting rid of all lewd women and woman tenant had to move was held actionable per se

Yeater v Mullins, 26 SW2d 757 , (Ky 1930) words alleging a theft are actionable slander per se, which presumes malice, which allows punitive damage - damages awarded

Justice v Wellman, 86 SW2d 132 , (Ky 1935); Mullins v Mutter, 151 SW2d 1047, (Ky 1941); word whore held actionable per se - remarks made in presence of others - damages awarded

We can easily recognize that such remarks are derogatory and offensive to some; We recognize that some believe that this behavior is immoral or indecent; We do not doubt that such charges will deprive the aggrieved party of friendship, intercourse, and society; We are aware that some believe that such behavior involves moral turpitude or immoral conduct; some believe these acts would degrade, disgrace, hold the aggrieved party up to public hatred, contempt or scorn; some see this as a charge implying immorality or indecency, character damage, injury to reputation and good will; some believe this is a statement subjecting the aggrieved party to hatred, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace or tending to induce an evil opinion of him in minds of right thinking people. [note4]

Next we need to examine the slander as it creates by association an affliction with an infectious disease. ? Can there be any doubt the infectious disease AIDS is closely linked to male homosexual behavior ? Linking the dim pall of homosexuality to an individual can literally increase the possibility of exposure to the deadly AIDS virus. One or more homosexuals may come to believe incorrectly that an individual is "available for" or "desirous of" same-sex encounters, and may respond to innocent conversation as if it were a sexual invitation. Simultaneously, the eligible female encounter group would shrink dramatically, to the social detriment of the slandered party. An individual may thus be exposed to a threat of the deadly AIDS virus in circumstances which would never have occurred except for a slander made in a crowded place.

Connor v Taylor, 26 SW2d 561 , (Ky 1930) infectious diseases, raises presumption of malice & damages

Because the damage to character and reputation is presumed by defamatory and slanderous per se words, no proof of malice is required and general damages are assessed against the tortfeasor.

general damages [r]elated to humiliation, mental anguish, mere embarrassment, Columbia Sussex Corp v Hay, 627 SW2d 270, (Ky 1981); injury presumed, need not be averred, (pled ready to verify) Sweeney v Brown, 60 SW2d 381, (Ky 1933); . . [d]efamatory per se does not require either that legal malice or special damage be proven EW Scripps v Cholmondelay, 569 SW2d 700 (Ky 1978)

[I]t is the exclusive providence of the jury to fix damages for personal injuries, . . Lou Taxicab v Reno, 35 SW2d 902 , (Ky 1931); Consolidated Coach v Phillips, 34 SW2d 722 , (Ky 1931)

Plaintiff asks for $1000.00 as general damages

general damages limited to that demanded in petition. . . Pape v Sutherland, 220 SW2d 372, (Ky 1949); Gassaway Const v Gentry, 264 SW2d 658, (Ky 1954); Adams Const v Bentley, 335 SW2d 912, (Ky 1960); Comm, DOH v Prather, 369 SW2d 118, (Ky 1963);

The issue of Special damages are only included in this pleading due to unforeseen circumstances which could result from the legal principle that plaintiff is forced to repeat a slander as a result of the filing of this complaint, which gives the slander wider publication in a brief time span. Special damages would be available if malice becomes evidenced during trial, since the general damages are limited to the small amount set forth in the complaint as filed.

Times v Lyttle, 77 SW2d 432, (Ky 1935); Columbia Sussex Corp v Hay, 627 SW2d 270, (Ky 1981) special - exemplary - punitive damages are to be predicated upon a showing of malice.

Engleman v Caldwell & Jones, 47 SW2d 971 , (Ky 1932) punitive damage covers uncertain injury, wanton conduct, derogatory or offensive remarks -

Lee v Stamper, 300 SW2d 251 at 253/54, (Ky 1957) failure to state in complaint an amount of special damages which must be proven to authorize recovery does not foreclose proof and recovery of such item -

Plaintiff prays for the court to give for relief :

• 1) A jury trial on all issues so tryable :
• 2) General damages, known as damages for character injury in the amount of $1000.00. This will be a clear message that redress may be had for torts committed in the class room setting.
• 3) Any other relief to which the Plaintiff shall become entitled to be awarded such as public retraction, and/or special damages for any evidenced malice.

{ A still later pleading included the following : } Under CR 26.02 and CR 36.01, Plaintiff is requesting that Defendant should produce a list of the identities and location [if known] of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, which is a list of the student's names and locations which Defendant reasonably may still have from the class identified in the Complaint.

ROBERT H. HEDGES ________________ PLAINTIFF

V

_________________, ATTY at LAW _______________ DEFENDANT

The Court stated that the record should show that the Plaintiff refused to answer a direct question. This is questionable reasoning. Plaintiff did not wish to answer the court with a conclusion of law, but was seeking to answer the court with a series of statements of fact which would lead the court to determine its own conclusion of law. A litigant is not supposed to respond to a court with conclusory statements, as these are considered non-responsive. A statement of numbers of witnesses might well be a conclusory statement, under the circumstances of this case. [note5]

The Court first requested that the litigants explain what the case is all about. Before receiving any specific response from either plaintiff or defendant, the Court then asked how many witnesses the defense had.

The Defendant responded that they had six witnesses. This appears to a conclusory statement, which the Court must have believed Plaintiff was obliged to answer in kind.

a) The defense was never required to identify who these witnesses were, nor what knowledge or facts these six unnamed individuals would bring before the court. Nowhere were these items stated in the pleadings. b) Plaintiff does not presume to explain any defense the defendants may have planned. however, since the case of plaintiff is based on one singular event, [as described in plaintiff's pleadings], the defense must have planned to call as witnesses the eyewitnesses to this singular event. No other testimony would serve to repudiate the case of Plaintiff. The only individuals who were eyewitnesses to the singular event are listed in the class roster. Any testimony or witnesses which might have bolstered the countersuit of defendant are part of a different matter entirely, and not part of the case before the court on that date. Therefore, Defendants witnesses must have been students from the class. Any student planned as a defense could be impeached by any student testifying for plaintiff, and defendant could not plan around the potential of testimony for plaintiff, nor plan perjury, and thus, Plaintiff must believe that even if defendant wishes to count those six unnamed students as witnesses for Defendant, this would necessarily be a conclusory statement, since Plaintiff was also a witness, and knows that no witness can repudiate the singular event herein under scrutiny, but rather only could state "I do not recall", or "I did not hear". No statement like "it did not happen" could have been the planned testimony of any of the six witnesses from the class. Any witness from the class could potentially be a witness for the Plaintiff, when the truth is exacted under penalty of perjury during cross examination. The facts may not have born out the conclusory statement of defendant that six witnesses were defense witnesses. Therefore, Plaintiff was correct in stating what the facts were, concerning the complete absence of students in the court, on that date, and at that time.

One of Plaintiff's specific goals in this case was to notify each student in this class so that no student could remain misinformed. The production of the class roster allowed this notice. Each student listed in the class roster were [excepting E.T. K----- who left no forwarding address] notified of the date, time, and location of the trial, by Plaintiff. [see letter exhibit, which was mailed to each on 14 Sept 1994. ].