one cannot be willfully ignorant of the law, since one is conclusively presumed to know the law, whether it is common and well known statute, or criminal law, or a close and technical construction of the constitution. Barker v Sterns Coal, 163 SW2d 466. (1942)

{T}he state. . .can speak and act only . . . by law, whatever it does say or do must be lawful. That which . . . is unlawful because made so by the Constitution of the US, is not the word or deed of the state, but is the mere wrong or trespass of the individual persons who falsely speak or act in her name. Keith v Clark, 97 US 454 at 465, (1878); Williams v Bruffy, 96 US 176 at 192, (1877); Horn v Lockhart, 17 Wall 570, (1873); Thorington v Smith, 8 Wall 1 at 9, (1868); Texas v White, 7 Wall 700, (1868) as cited in Poindexter v Greenhow, 114 US 270 at 290, (1884)

. . .we shall never immolate truth, justice and the law, because a state tribunal has erected an alter and decreed the sacrifice v . . Gelpcke v Dubuque, 1 Wall 175 at 206, (1863) Swayne J

the 14th Amendment's limitations on state action would be illusory indeed if state practices were synonmous with due process - Shango v Jurich, 681 F2d 1091 at 1098, (7th Cir 1981)

inexcusable neglect in a state court allows federal court to vacate state court's default - Butner v Neustradter, 324 F2d 783 at 786/87, (9th Cir 1963)

every court in the country is a court of limited jurisdiction, US v Silliman, 167 F2d 607 at 618, (3rd Cir 1948) 335 US 825 denied -

The statute violated is KRS 132.420. Notice was sent to Judge Field's court 18 Feb 1994, and several months prior to that.

Estes v Comm, 86-SC-756-DG at 4 (slp op 17 Dec 1987) ancient common law disqualification. . . . . .once upon a time the common law disqualified the testimony of interested parties; it "excluded the testimony of the parties to the law suit and all persons having a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome" McCormick on Evidence 2d ed. (1972) ¤ 65 p. 142.

. . . interested witness incompetent to conduce to success of suit. . .Jack v Carneal, II AK Marsh 849 (Ky 1820) Owsley J

The old common law shutters at the idea of any person testifying who had the least interest. . . . . State v Barrows, 76 ME 401 at 409, ( ) cited in Ferguson v Georgia, 365 US 570 at 575, (1960)

There is no authority for a judge to make an order or sign a judgment elsewhere than at chambers or at circuit clerk's office, or at some place in any county in the district. KRS 23.150. Gross Adm'x v Couch, Ky 166 SW2d 879, (1942) [citations omitted]

A special judges direction, to enter judgment and his signing of the order book in a county not in the district containing the county where cause was pending, were ineffective. KRS 23.150. Gross Adm'x v Couch, Ky 166 SW2d 879, (1942) [citations omitted]

Fort v Kremmer, 197 SW 538, (1917) judgment and execution outside district are invalid.

State Ex Rel Connellsville Coal v Continental Coal, 186 SE 119 at 120, (1935) same cause, same action, same parties in same respective positions is vexatious which the law forbids.

in civil cases the law abhors a multiplicity of cases. . . Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436 at 443, (1970) at 457

" To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or justice, . . . no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or otherwise destroyed: nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. " 1215 Magna Charter as cited in Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12 at 17, (1955)

do the laws secure to an individual an equal protection when he is allowed to come into court and make his claim or defense subject to the conditions that upon a failure to make good that claim or defense the penalty for such failure either appropriates all his property or subjects him to extravagant and unreasonable loss. . . Cotting v Kansas City Stock Yards Co. 183 US 79 at 100, as cited in Ex Parte Young supra at 146

. . . . to put the entire burden of vigilance on the defendant council, thereby relieving the court and the state of their statutory and constitutional duties, is an egregious error. McTush v Comm, 90-SC-247-MR (dissent slp op at 1-2, 26 Sept 1991) Combs J.

fraud will vitiate even the most solumn transactions and an asserted title to property, founded upon it, is utterly void. US v The Aimsted, 15 US 518 at 594, (1841)

fraud is not confined to vicious import of a wicked motive or deliberate deceit, or an affirmative act purportedly conceived, but is deemed sufficiently expansive to embrace merely leading astray, throwing off guard, or lulling into security and inaction. Johnson v Gervert Bros. Lumber, 75 SW2d 357, (KY 1934)

fraud vitiates everything it touches . . .it is difficult to define . . there is no absolute rule as to what facts constitute fraud, and the law does not promote one "lest knavish ingenuiety may avoid it". White v Union Producing, 140 F2d 176 at 178, (5th Cir 1946)

the law does not permit a covenant of immunity to be drawn that will protect a person against his own fraud. Fraud destroys all consent. It is the purpose of the law to shield only those whose armor embraces good faith. Hansen v Am Nat Bank, 844 SW2d 408, (KY 1992) cert granted (1993) citing Bryant v Troutman, 287 SW2d 978, (KY 1956)

even in cases where the direct issue of fraud is involved, knowledge may be imputed where one willfully close their eyes to information which is within his reach. Wrecker v Nat Enameling, 204 US 176 at 185, (1907); Lisanby v Ill Cent RR, 272 SW 753, (1925)

refraining from investigating that which it is his duty to investigate, any resulting violation of the statute must be regarded as "in effect intentional" Corsicana Nat Bank v Johnson, 251 US 68 at 71/72, (1919)

when a party asserts that something is true, when he does not know whether it is true or untrue, he is practicing a fraud upon the party with whom he deals. It is the policy of the courts to suppress fraud, and at the same time it is the policy of the court not to encourage negligence and inattention on the part of the purchaser of the property. It has been said that it is the lesser of two evils to encourage negligence in the foolish rather than to encourage fraud in the deceitful. The foolish and credulous should be protected against the machinations of the designedly wicked. Bunch v Bertram, 294 SW 805 at 808, (1927)

An action of forceable detainer is a summary proceeding provided by the Code to restore to a landlord premises unlawfully detained by a mere tenant. . . Hall's Extrs v Robinson, 165 SW2d 163, (1942)

To maintain an action of forceable detainer, the relationship of landlord and tenant must exist. . . . Hall's Extrs v Robinson, 165 SW2d 163, (1942)

. . . . unless the relationship of landlord & tenant existed at some time period between the parties there can be no implied promise to pay rent, and without the existence of such promise, express or implied, an action at law cannot be maintained and rent recovered therein for the use and occupation of the land. Richmond & Lex Turnpike v Rogers, 70 Ky 532 (1871).

Defendant did not enter [ the property ] against the will of Plaintiff. . did not obtain the possession as a tenant. . . . .he is not afterwards liable to eviction in a proceeding by warrant for forceable detainer. Morris v Bowles, 1 Dana 97 (Ky 1833) CJ Robertson

. . . as the possession was acquired by assent of Plaintiff/Appellee, defendant could not have been guilty of forceable detainer in the sense intended by the act. . . Hayes v Connel's Heirs, 1 Marsh 393. as cited in Jack v Carneal, II AK Marsh 849 (Ky 1820) Owsley J

. . . . it is only when the possession is obtained by defendant as tenant, that he can be adjudged guilty of forceably detaining the premises, by refusing to restore possession. 1 Marsh 320 Jack v Carneal, II AK Marsh 849 (Ky 1820) Owsley J

. . that if the tenant deny that he entered the premises as tenant to the plaintiff. . . he shall not be adjudged to be a tenant within the meaning of this act, unless the plaintiff shall satisfactorily prove the the defendant obtained the possession as tenant to the plaintiff. . . . . Helm v Slader, 1 AK Marsh 236, (Ky 1818) CJ Boyle

[emphesis mine] . . . . and that relation [father and son], though not a valuable, is deemed in law a good consideration, and will uphold the promise. MÕIntyre v Hughes, 4 Bibb 187, (1815) CJ Boyle as cited in Ford v Ellingwood, 3 Met 359, (1860) Duvall J

under the statute of uses, the proximity of blood between father and son, is sufficient to support a covenant by the former to stand seized to the use of the latter. . . M'Intyre v Hughes, 4 Bibb 187, (1815) CJ Boyle

Executors cannot maintain an action of forceable detainer unless they have a vestiture of title. Hall's Extrs v Robinson, 165 SW2d 163, (1942)

Unless Executors have a vestiture of title, they cannot maintain this action . . . [forceable detainer] Prewitt v Durham's Exrs, 5 TB Mont 17 (Ky 1827)

. . . ordinarily, title to land vests in executor only when there is a divise to them and in absence of such divise, executors have neither title nor right of possession of lands. . . Hall's Extrs v Robinson, 165 SW2d 163, (1942)

a mere direction to executors to sell lands for the purpose of distribution does not vest title in him. Fee passes to the heir, subjected to be divested by a sale by the executor. . . Warfield v English, Ky 11 SW 662 (1889)

This decision is a triumph of form over substance, a victory for those who favor the "sporting theory" of law over the "search for the truth." The new rules of civil procedure in general, and the rule of relation back (CR 15.03) in particular, were designed for the opposite result to avoid victory through technicality and achieve trial on the merits. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure Civil ** 1029 and 1499. [at 1] [T]he ends of justice are not served when forfeiture of just claims because of technical rule is allowed. " Travelers Indemnity Co. v United States, 382 F2d at 106. [at 4] as cited in Nolph v Scott, 725 SW2d 860, (KY 1987) dissent , Liebson & Lambert JJ

It is time that we so define the law on the subject as to comply with what would be considered just by reasonable people. In the 18th century there were judges who believed that the purpose of the law was to ferret out technicalities with which to deny justice. But in the age of modern jurisprudence we should not seek out means to structure the judicial process to confound the litigants. We should interpret the rules of procedure to give effect to the substantive rights and the legitimate expectations of the litigant not to thwart them. . . Green v Champy, 86- SC-998-DG (dissent slp op 25 Nov. 1987) at 11, Liebson & Lambert JJ

The common law is our responsibility, and while always affording stare decisis its due, we recognize the responsibility to correct its imperfections. As stated in Hilen v Hays, 673 SW2d 713, (Ky 1984) at 717 : The common law is not a stagnant pool, but a moving stream.

. . . The common law is our responsibility; the child of the courts. We are responsible for the direction." Grayson FOE v Claywell, 736 SW2d 328, (KY 1987)

Oral contract to divise property to plaintiff in consideration of services to be rendered during testatrix' lifetime held not in statute of frauds, notwithstanding contract was to continue so long as testatrix should live. Lee v McCrocklin Adm'r 56 SW2d 570 (KY 1933)

But the court has uniformly held that the statute [of frauds] is a shield, not a sword, and that where the party has received the consideration of the contract the court will not allow him to rely upon the statute and keep the consideration. Cline v. Waters, 85 SW 209 (KY 1905)

Where judgement of dismissal in prior action for cancellation of deed for failure of consideration could have been based upon any one of several issues, none of which appeared in the judgement, such judgement of dismissal would not constitute a conclusive adjudication, in subsequent action to cancel deed for failure of consideration, as to any of the issues involved, even though the parties were the same in both actions. Ingram v. Turner, 301 SW2d 436. (KY 1957)

Where it is impossible to determine on which of two possible grounds judgement is based, judgement is not res judicata on either ground. First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Board of Education of Whitley Co.Ky., 5 F.Supp. 49, reversed 78 F2d 114. (6th Cir 1934)

When the basis for an earlier ruling is not made clear, it cannot operate as res judicata. Philpot v. Minton. 370 SW2d 402. (KY 1963)

Judgement basis of which is ambiguous is not res judicata..... Melaro v. Mezzantto, 352 F2d 720 (DC Cir 1965) Cites Philpot v. Minton supra.......

Doctrine of res judicata will not be applied unless there is an identity of parties, identity of the two causes of action, and the action must be decided on it's merits. City of Louisville LPFF Assn. Local Union #345 IAFF AFL-CIO by & through Gnagie 813 SW2d 804,(KY 1991) Haeberle v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 769 SW2d 64. (KY 1989)7 Bertlesman & Phillips, Ky Practice, CR 39.03, comment 2,5 (4th Ed 1984)

In order to rely on doctrine of res judicata, defendants in subsequent action would have to prove that the issue involved in subsequent action was present and actually determined in prior action, in view of fact that such did not appear from the record. Ingram v. Turner, 301 SW2d 436 (Ky 1957)