. . . existence of good will is question of fact for the factfinder - Taormina v Calicchia, 355 SW2d 569 (Tex. App 1962)

. . .the chief elements of good will are continuity of place and continuity of name - 24 Am Jur ¤ 805 - cites Yost - Kershaw v Knox Kershaw Co, 523 SO2d 351 at 357, (Ala. Sup 1988)

. . . good will is generally understood to mean advantages that accrue to a business on account of its name, location, reputation, or success. Taormina v Calicchia, 355 SW2d 569 (Tex. App 1962)

. . . good will exists as property merely as an incident to other property rights and is not susceptible to being owned and disposed of separately and apart from the property right to which it is incident - 38 CJS Good Will ¤3 p. 951 - Yost v Patrick, 17 SO2d 240, (Ala. Sup 1944)

. . . as far as dependent upon location or name, good will may become extinct or rendered less valuable by termination of right to continue to occupy the premises or the loss of the right to do business under name used. The chief element of value in good will is the continuity of place and the continuity of name. 38 CJS Good Will, ¤4 p. 953 cites Yost -Jackson v Caldwell, 415 P2d 667 (Utah Sup 1966)

. . . retiring partner leaves good will at old place, with old name - cites Menendez v Holt (below) - Brown Chemical v Meyer, 139 US 540 at 548, (1890)

. . a generation cometh, and a generation passeth away, but the land enduereth forever - Biblical quote -

. . . Liens are property rights and cannot be divested as a matter of procedure - In Re Penn Cent Brewing, 114 F2d 1010 at 1013, (3rd Cir 1940) 312 US 685 denied, 135 F2d 63, (3rd Cir 194_); Britton v Western Iowa Co, 9 F2d 488 at 491, (8th Cir 1925); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall [ 88 US] 558 at 579, (1874)

. . . The essence of ownership is the constitutional right to not be deprived of the right to a fair return on investment - RR CommÕr Cases, 116 US 307 at 331, (1885); NP RR v N Dakota, 236 US 585 at 596, (1889); Near v Minne, 283 US 697 at 707, (1930); LA Gas v RR Commn, 289 US 287, (1932); Aetna Co. v Hype, 275 US 440, (1928)

. . . coercive activity that prevents its victims from making free choices between market alternatives is inherently destructive of competitive conditions and may be condemned even without proof of its actual market effect. Kiefer Stewart v Joseph E Seagram & Sons, 340 US 211 at 213, (1951)

. . . .good will is a matter which may be preserved . . . if the business is such as a going concern, but which is wholly lost, if the concern is wound up.? - good will is a privilege that gives a reasonable expectancy of a preference in the race of competition- such expectancy may come from succession in place or name or otherwise to business that has won the favor of its customers. It is then known as good will. Waterbury v Waterbury, 128 SW2d 568 at 572, (Ky1939)

. . . .Good will has no existence except in connection with a going concern business. It cannot be separated from the going business to which it is incident. Pfleghar Hardware Specialty Co v Blair, 30 F2d 614 at 616, (2nd Cir 1929) Grace Bros v IRS, 173 F2d 170 at 175, (9th Cir 1949)

. . . every positive advantage that has been acquired by the old firm in the progress of business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was previously carried on, or with the name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business [is good will] Menendez v Holt, 128 US 514 at 522, (1888) Grace Bros v IRS, 173 F2d 170 at 176, (9th Cir 1949)

. . . if by the nature of the action the condemnee is precluded from transferring its business, going concern, or good will value to another location, evidence is to be heard to substantiate damage. Kimball Laundry v US, 338 US 1 at 15, (1949)

. . . the measure of the compensation is the loss suffered by the former owner, not the gain accruing to the taker. - compensation is a constitutionally required substantive right - Boston C of C v Boston, 217 US 188 at 195, (1909); McGovern v NY, 229 US 363, (1912); US v Miller, 317 US 369, (1942); US v GM, 323 US 373 at 377/378, (1944); US v Causby, 328 US 256 at 262 n7, (1945); US v Felin, 334 US 624 at 631, (1947); Kimball Laundry v US, 338 US 1 at 13, 23, (1948)

. . .equity will interfere to prevent an unconscionable harm to a tenant who has a long-standing interest in that particular location. JNA Realty v Cross Bay, 366 NE2d 1313, (NY 1977) as cited in Rose v Trabue, 91-CA-2511-MR, (slp op 20 Aug 1993)

. . .good will is a benefit beyond capital investment, and a barber shop with a 25 years history of 11 pm service has a vested property right protected from arbitrary interference by state or city - McDermott v City of Seattle, 4 F Supp 855 at 857, (DC Wash 1933)

. . . judges . . . who step outside of the circle of duty thus drawn by the letter of the statute, they must answer in damages to such individuals as may suffer from such unauthorized acts. Blincoe v Head, 44 SW 374, (1898); Reed v Taylor, 78 SW 892, (1904)

one who has a reasonable expectancy of a contract has a property right - Hardy v Erickson, 36 NYS2d 823 at 826, (1942); tortious interference extends to mere negotiations. - Morse v Swank, 459 F Supp 660 at 667, (SDNY 1978)

coercive activity that prevents its victims from making free choices between market alternatives is inherently destructive of competive conditions and may be condemned even without proof of its actual market effect. Kiefer Stewart v Joseph E Seagram & Sons, 340 US 211 at 213, (1951)

There is no doubt the general principle is favored, both in law and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his own property, or the use of it. Lord Ellenborough, in Aldnut v Inglis, 12 East 527 at 537, cited in Munn v Ill, 94 US 113 at 127, (1876)

The essence of ownership is the constitutional right to not be deprived of the right to a fair return on investment - RR CommÕr Cases, 116 US 307 at 331, (1885); NP RR v N Dakota, 236 US 585 at 596, (1889); Near v Minne, 283 US 697 at 707, (1930); LA Gas v RR Commn, 289 US 287, (1932); Aetna Co. v Hype, 275 US 440, (1928)

. . . the term property is therefore said to include everything which is subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, choses in action as well as in possession, everything which has an exchangeable value, or which goes to make up one's wealth or estate. Button v Drake, 195 SW2d 66 at 68/69, (1946)

. . . . deceit as a tort requires something in the way of knowledge of the falsity of the statement, and an intention to mislead, - Walker v Sheldon, 179 NE2d 497, (NY App 1961); Payne v Jackson, 203 SO2d 443, (AL 1967); Broomfield v Mann, 643 P2d 100, (KS 1982)

. . . Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 comment - Golden Eagle Dist v Burroughs, 801 F2d 1531, (9th Cir 1986)

. . . When a party asserts that something is true, when he does not know whether it is true or untrue, he is practicing a fraud upon the party with whom he deals. It is the policy of the courts to suppress fraud, and at the same time it is the policy of the court not to encourage negligence and inattention on the part of the purchaser of the property. It has been said that it is the lesser of two evils to encourage negligence in the foolish rather than to encourage fraud in the deceitful. The foolish and credulous should be protected against the machinations of the designedly wicked. Bunch v Bertram, 294 SW 805 at 808, (1927)

. . . law imposes on each of several tortfeasors burden of proving his own innocence or his own limited liability, Murphy v Taxicabs of Lou. KY 330 SW2d 395, (KY 1959)

. . . Under concert of action theory plaintiff may sue group of possible tort-feasors when unable to identify particular tort-feasor responsible for injury; burden of identification is therefore shifted to each of defendants to prove that it was not one responsible for particular injury. Dawson v Bristol Labs, 658 F Supp 1036, (WD KY 1987)

. . . a defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of precise damages suffered by the plaintiff is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the same exactness and preciseness as would otherwise be possible. Eastman v Southern Photo, 273 US 359 at 378/79, (1926)

. . . party may be liable either as one who aids or abets another to break contract, or as one who, by procuring breach of duty, becomes joint tort-feasor.= Steelvest v Scansteel Service Center, 8O7 SW2d 476, (KY 1991)

. . . rarely is it possible to demonstrate to any absolute certainty what would have happened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass - Jeanes v Milner, 428 F2d 598 at 605, (8th Cir 1970) cites Hicks v US, 368 F2d 626 at 632, (4th Cir 1966)

. . . a conspiracy is a corrupt or unlawful combination or agreement between two or more persons to do by concerted action . . .a lawful act by unlawful means. . . McDonald v Goodman et al, 239 SW2d 97, (1951)

. . . single or multiple conspiracy is a question of fact; joining the agreement, not the group is the requirement of conspiracy; names of other conspirators are not required to convict one conspirator; agreement to conspire is one offense; substantive offense is separate and independent . . . . tortous act; - US v Townsend, 924 F2d 1385, (7th Cir 1991)

. . . fraud and conspiracy are not the cause of action, but rather the overt acts done in furtherance of the fraudulent plan. . . . The gist of the action is the damage and not the conspiracy. The charge of conspiracy where unsupported by evidence will be considered mere surplusage, not necessary to be proved to support the action. He may yet recover damages against one or more of the defendants shown to be guilty of the torts . US v Pan Am Petroleum, 55 F2d 753 at 778, (9th Cir 1932)

. . . it is not the form of the combination or the particular means used, but the result to be achieved that the statute condemns. It is equally clear that it is of no importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are themselves unlawful. Acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may be in themselves wholly innocent acts, yet if they are part of a sum of the acts which relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy the law forbids, they fall within the condemnation of the statute. Swift v US, 196 US 375, (1904); Standard Oil v US, 221 US 1, (1910); US v Am Tobacco Co, 221 US 106, (1910); US v Socony-Vacuum, 310 US 150, (1939); Apex Hosery v Leader, 310 US 469, (1939); Fashion Guide v FTC, 312 US 457, (1940); Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, (1942)

. . . in nearly all cases in which a combination or conspiracy is established through circumstantial evidence, the alleged conspirators have engaged in conduct which is in some sense congruent, compatible or harmonious - Nurse Midwifery v Hibbert, 689 F Supp 799 at 807, ( ND Tenn 1988)

. . . conspiracies are rarely prove by direct evidence - Morgan v Sylvester, 125 F Supp 380, ( SD NY 1954)

. . . malice is imputed where wrongful act evidenced entire want of care or great indifference to consequences and rights of others RB Tyler v Kinser, 346 SW2d 306, (KY 1961)

. . . Justice Holmes described this form of malice as follows: "if the manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm follows, we say that it is done maliciously or intentionally. . . . "Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv L Rev. 1, at 1 (1894) as quoted in 49 U CHI LR 61 at p. 94 . . . Malice required for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations may be inferred by proof of lack of justification.= NCAA v Hornung, 754 SW2d 855, (KY 1988)

the government of the US has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men - it will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right - Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 LEd2d 60 (1803) Marshall CJ

a vested right protected by the Federal and state constitution is some right or interest in property which has become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy if it does not include claims contrary to justice and equity - Downs v Blount, 170 Fed 15 at 21, (5th Cir 1909) the court is without authority (jurisdiction) to forgive vested rights - Mauk v Mauk, 873 SW2d 213, (KY App 1994)

good faith is performance of a series of acts necessary to the accomplishment of the end intended - good faith leads to a vested interest - the due process clause of the 14th Amendment protects vested rights from encroachment by states - Darlington v Board of Councilmen, 140 SW2d 392, (KY 1940); Perkins v Joint Planning, 480 SW2d 166 at 168, (KY 1972)

principle of vested rights reflects principles of common and constitutional law - owner acquired real property rights which cannot be taken away - equity is separate - Allen v Honolulu, 571 P2d 328 at 329, (HA 1977) ; Kavai v Pacific Standard, 653 P2d 766 at 771, (HA Sup 1982)

A vested right must be complete and consumated, and of such [a nature] that it cannot be divested without the consent of the person to whom it belongs - Merchants Bank v Gerrard, 124 SE 715, (GA Sup 1924) Words & Phrases -Graham v Great Falls Power, 76 P 808 at 810/11, (Mont Sup 1904)

vested interest cases - Federal Material v Baker, 885 SW2d 704, (KY 1994); Sanderson v Saxon, 834 SW2d 676, (KY 1992); State v Ritter's Estate, 46 NE2d 736 at 743, (IN App 1943); Miller v Dewey Beach, 521 A2d 642 at 645, (Del Sup 1986); Homeowners Grp v First National, 521 NE2d 1202 at 1208, (Ill App 1988)

occupation and improvements on public land with a view to preemption . . . . will act against other persons who do not have equal or superior rights. Frisbie v Whitney, 76 US 187, (1869)

a vested interest in land is created by occupancy with expectation of completed title - Kansas Supreme Court overruled - Ard v Brandon, 156 US 537, (1894)

First National Bank v Rockford, 361 NE2d 832 at 842, (Ill App 1977) common law doctrine of vested rights is recognized in IL -

fiduciary relationships are recognized by: 1) the workings of law (atty-client relationship for example) 2) by the facts of a particular situation - the clear and convincing standard of proof applies - In Re Estate of Rothenberg, 530 NE2d 1148 at 1150, (Ill App 1988) the minority is vunerable to a variety of oppressive devices termed freezeouts which the majority may employee - Donahue v Rodd Electrotype, 328 NE2d 505 at 513, (Mass 1975)

undisputed evidence about fair market price of stock gives minority shareholder rights to sue - squeeze out and freeze-out can be attacked as breach of duty of loyalty or good faith to each other - Fought v Morris, 543 SO2d 167, (Miss 1989)

. . .any attempt to squeeze out a minority shareholder must be viewed as a breach of his fiduciary duties . . .such conduct is injurious when the result is the exclusion of the minority shareholders without adequate recompense and is particularly harmful when carried out with malevolence or indifference . . .the law recognizes a right to recovery under such circumstances - Orchard v Covelli, 590 F Supp 1548 at 1557, (WD PA 1984) 802 F2d 408, (3rd Cir 1986) affd - cited in Fought v Morris, 543 SO2d 167, (Miss 1989)

Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctillio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.' As trenchantly stated by the distinguished jurist, Chief Judge Cardozo, in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 NE 545 at 546, (NY 1928); Bryan v. Security Trust Co., 176 SW2d 104, (KY 1943); So say we. Also see to the same effect the case of Re Estate of Elder, 83 P2d 477, (OR 1938), and our late case of Karsner's Ex'r v. Monterey Christian Church, 200 SW2d 474. (KY 1947); Carpenter v. Planck, 201 SW2d 908 at 910, (KY 1947)

In the companion case of Cook v. Holland, Ky.App., 575 SW2d 468 (this day decided), we have discussed in greater detail the tort liability of fiduciaries. Under the orthodox common law rule, a trustee or other fiduciary is personally liable for torts arising out of the administration of the estate. Only if the fiduciary is completely without personal fault may he receive indemnification out of the corpus of the trust estate. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 590 SW2d 885 (Ky App. 1978)

We also note that sections 3-808 and 7-306 of the Uniform Probate Code authorize direct actions against a personal representative or trustee in his fiduciary capacity for torts committed in the course of the administration of the trust. . . . the common law rule in Kentucky [is] that a trustee was not an agent having the power to bind the beneficiaries of the trust. Auxier v. Aetna Ins. Co., 222 Ky. 243, 300 SW 617 at 619 (KY 1927). Cook v. Holland, 575 SW2d 468, (Ky App 1978)

a stockholderÕs individual suit is to enforce a right against the corp which the stockholder possesses as an individual - Rules Of Civil Procedure for US District Courts - Advisory CommÕe Notes, (1966) HR Document # 391, 89th Congress 2d Sess 410. - majority shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities . . . . in a manner detrimental to the minority - Jones v HF Ahamson Co., 460 P2d 464 at 470-71, (CA 1969)

We repeat what was said in Stephens v. Stephens, 183 SW2d 822 at 824: 'The relationship of partners is a close one and imposes upon each the obligation of loyalty, integrity and the utmost good faith and fairness with respect to partnership affairs. Betts v. Smither, 220 SW2d 989, (KY 1949)

abritrary and capretious standard of review is appropriate only when trustees exercise discretionary power to make decision - Firestone Tire v Brunch, 489 US 101, (1989) cited or de novo review when there is an absence of discretionary power -Curry v Cincinatti Equitable, 834 SW2d 701, (KY 1992)

. . minority stockholders . . . . could recover damages incurred when defendant forced plaintiff out of a prosperous going business, to plaintiffÕs detriment - [It may be legal and] That this power is found in statute, supplies no reason for clothing it with a superior sanctity or to vest it with the atributes of tyranny - equity looks to the essential character and result - The damages are the difference between a prosperous going concern business and the sale as of physical assets - Lebold v Inland Steel, 125 F2d 369 at 374/75, (7th Cir 1941) Complaint dismissed in District Court and reversed in Circuit on appeal .

The nub of the problem is that an absolute freeze out right would mean that those in control rather than the stockholders himself would decide when he shall sell his [property] stock. Bryan v Brock & Blevins, 490 F2d 563 at 570, (5th Cir 1974)

it is a sad comentary on the law if, when a trustee of a corporation estate is making an improper disposition of it, or has shown improper impartiality towards one of its conflicting parties, or has put the estate in a fix it is liable and likely to be either wasted or destroyed, or mercilessly taken from all and given to a part, a court could not reach out its arm and preserve and administer the estate - Cantwell v Columbia, 97 SW 167 at 179, (MO 1906)

we agree with the practically unanimous judicial opinion that liquidation of solvent going [concern] {corp} . . .involving as it usually will accentuation of the economic waste incident to any receiverships and most forced sales - acts which lower value of stock of minority stockholders attracts stern attention of the court - Patton v Nicholas, 279 SW2d 848, (TX 1955)

We conclude that tort liability exists in Kentucky for the malicious interference with known contractual rights of another when special damage results therefrom, at least when accomplished by some unlawful means such as fraud, deceit or coercion. n1 We would place the breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship on a par with fraud and deceit. The pleadings sufficiently charge the tort of malicious interference with known contractual rights of another through the use of unlawful means. Henkin v Berea Bank & Trust Co., 566 SW2d 420, (Ky App. 1978)

NCAA v. Hornung, 754 SW2d 855 at 858 (KY 1988).

An action for interference with contract rights will lie if defendant has procured breach by deception or coercion or caused the severance of a master-servant relationship. -Party damaged by interference with his contract rights can recover even though he cannot establish fraud or coercion or a master servant relationship. Carmichael-Lynch-Nolan Ad Agency, Inc. & Tony Nolan v Bennett & Assoc. Inc. Ky.App., 561 S.W.2d 99 (1977)

The fact that an employment is at the will of the employer and employee does not make it one at the will of others, and unjustified interference of third parties is actionable although the employment may be at will. Truax v. Raich, 239 US 33. (1915)

the right to earn a livelihood and to continue employment unmolested by efforts to enforce. . . .[void enactments] . . is entitled to protection in equity in the absence of an adequate remedy at law. . . Truax v Raich, 239 US 33. (1915)

Unenforceability of contract (about land, under statute of frauds) is no defense to action for tortuous interference with its performance. Clements v Withers, 437 SW2d 818, (TX Sup Ct. 1969) . . under Ky law, stranger to a contract may be liable in Tort for interference with contractual relation between Plaintiff and a 3rd party. . . interference with employment agreement terminable at will may give rise to tort liability. . . . Cesnik v Chrysler, 490 F Supp 869, (1980)

an employee has no right to continued employment, but nevertheless has an expectation that his employment will continue. . . Emery v Marrimack, 701 F2d 988, (1st Cir 1983) Slucher v Safety Coach Transit, 17 SW2d 1012, (Ky 1929), Chambers v Probst, 140 SW 575, (Ky 1911)

loss of self esteem for emotional distress due to breach of employment contract/wrongful discharge -no expert testimony was required - jury - instructions on willful, wanton insulting breach - Allabashi v Lincoln Sales, 824 P2d 1, (Colo App 1991)

bankruptcy, emparassment, humiliation, severe depression, physical condition exacerbated - Knauf Fiberglass v Stein, 615 NE2d 115, (Ind App 1993)

. . . Where the malicious prosecution plaintiff's reputation has not been assailed, the plaintiff has not been imprisoned, or the plaintiffs property has not been seized or its use prevented, the damages which may be recovered are limited to the plaintiffs loss of time and the reasonable expenses incurred in defense of the action beyond the ordinary costs. Harter v Lewis Stores 240 SW2d 86 (KY 1951).

. . . Contact, however slight, trifling or trivial will support a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. (fright, shock or mental anguish) Deutsch v Shein, 597 SW2d 141 at 146 (KY 1980).

. . . .loss of job, loss of home, devastating reduction in societal status, loss of consortium - Vascocu v Acme Cement, 610 SO2d 258, 615 SO 2d 341, (LA App 1992)

duty or standard of care is a question of law for the court - Davies v Comm, 349 F Supp 62, (DC Ky 1972) Thus summary dismissal is wrong.

negligence is a question of fact for jury - US v Marshall, 230 F2d 183 at 187, (9th 1956)

. . . False light in the public eye (Lord Byron 1816) This is defined as : rogue's gallery, pity, ridicule, mental stress, humiliation, objectionable to reasonable person.

. . to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society." Kimmerle v N.Y Evening Jour. 186 NE 217 (NY App 1933). This definition seems to have originated with Baron Parke in Parmiter v Coupland, 151 Eng Rep. 340, (1840)

. . . degrade, disgrace, hold him up to public hatred, contempt or scorn Digest Pub Co. v Perry Pub Co., 284 SW2d 832 , (KY 1956)

. . . false light invasion of privacy - O'Brien v Williamson Daily News, 735 FS 224 at 225, (ED Ky 1990)

6) The Defendant's actions have damaged Plaintiff social standing, emotional health, physical health, self esteem, and has caused depression, feelings of dispair, extreme humiliation, and embarrassment.

. . . loss of self esteem for emotional distress due to breach of employment contract/wrongful discharge-jury instructions on willful, wanton insulting breach - Allabashi v Lincoln Sales, 824 P2d 1, (Colo App 1991)

. . . destruction of house leads to depression and feelings of dispair, nightmares etc. Sullivan v Boston Gas, 605 NE2d 805, 621 NE2d 1194, (Mass 1992)

. . . bankruptcy, embarrassment, humiliation, severe depression, physical condition exacerbated - Knauf Fiberglass v Stein, 615 NE2d 115, (Ind App 1993) . . . accident led to loss of job, loss of home, devastating reduction in societal status, loss of consortium - Vascocu v Acme Cement, 610 SO2d 258, 615 SO 2d 341, (LA App 1992)

. . . extreme humiliation, embarrassment, worry, inconvenience - false arrest-Price v Louisiana, 608 SO2d 203, (LA App 1992)

. . . the cutting down of timber, . . . .is destructive of the substance of the estate; [irreparable] - Erhradt v Borao, 113 US 537 at 539, (1884) Field J

. . . exclusive right to hunting tule is irreparable [injury] - Dunker v Field & Tule, 92 P 502 at 506, (Cal 1907)

. . . it is irreparable to take one's land and give it into another's possession - Bradley v Rumph, 196 SO 500 at 501, (Ala. 1940)

. . . the characteristics constituting irreparable injury are: 1) that the injury is an act which is a serious change of or is destructive to the property it affects either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoyed. - History lost and destroyed -
2) that the property must have some peculiar quality or use such that its pecuniary value, as estimated by a jury, will not fairly recompense the owner for the loss - there is no substitute with non-historic land -
Pomeroys Equitable Remedies ¤ 495 Pomeroys Eq Juris Vol. 5 c23 p. 1357 ¤ 493 - ¤ 511 ; Rosenberg v Am Hotel & Garden Co. 121 A 9 at 13, (NJ 1923); Moss v Jordan, 92 SO 689 at 690, (Miss 1922); Camp v Dixon, 38 SE 71 at 73, (Ga. 1901); Hood v Foster, 13 SO2d 652 at 654, (Miss 1943); Dunker v Field & Tule, 92 P 502 at 506, (CA 1907)

. . . if the trespass, although a single act is or would be destructive, if the injury is or would be irreparable. That is, such a nature that, when accomplished, the property cannot be restored to the original condition or cannot be replaced by means of compensation in money, then the wrong will be prevented or stopped by injunction. Eq Jur ¤ 1357, Pomeroys Eq Remedies ¤ 495 cited in Rosenberg v Am Hotel & Garden Co. 121 A 9 at 13, (NJ 1923)