6TH CIRCUIT JUDGMENT 95-5904
HEDGES V
STUMBO, ET AL
by Robert Hedges ©
6TH CIRCUIT JUDGMENT 95-5904
HEDGES V
STUMBO, ET AL
by Robert Hedges ©
Before: BROWN, MARTIN, and SILER, Circuit Judges
Robert H. Hedges, a Kentucky citizen, appeals pro se a
district court order dismissing his civil rights action. This
case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule
9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel
unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App.
P. 34(a).
Seeking declaratory and monetary relief, Hedges filed this
action against several Kentucky state court judges, a court clerk
and commissioner, and an attorney. His complaint essentially
sought to overturn the results in several state court proceedings
regarding the sale of
No. 95-5904
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real estate previously belonging to his deceased father. Hedges
complained that he was wrongfully removed from the property by a
forcible detainer in 1989, that the price received at the 1992
sale of the property was insufficient, and that his appeal of the
confirmation of the sale was erroneously dismissed as late. The
defendants moved to dismiss on a number of grounds. Hedges then
f~led an amended complaint adding more defendants. The district
court granted the motion to dismiss. The order of dismissal
crossed in the mail with motions by the newly added defendants to
dismiss for the reasons stated in the original motion. After
Hedges fled a notice of appeal of the order of dismissal, the
district court entered another order clarifying that the amended
complaint was also dismissed.
On appeal, some of the defendants-appellees have moved to
dismiss or strike appellant's brief, due to his failure to comply
with the requirements of briefing. We deny this motion, as it is
clear that the district court's order of dismissal should be
affirmed despite the deficiencies of the appellate brief. Hedges
has filed a "multi-motion" to declare the district court's
postjudgment order void, or amend his notice of appeal to include
this order, or extend the period for appealing this order. We
grant this motion to the extent that we find that the timely
filing of a notice of appeal of the final order divested the
district court of jurisdiction. See Dickerson v. McClellan, 37
F.3d 251, 252 (6th Cir. 1994) (order). Because the district court
lacked jurisdiction to enter a second order of dismissal, Hedges
is not required to file an additional notice of appeal or pay an
additional filing fee in order to appeal the entirety of the
dismissal. Moreover, all of the parties, including those named in
the amended complaint, have filed briefs on appeal and apparently
concede that the district court's original order of dismissal was
final.
Federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
482 (1983). Allegedly incorrect decisions by a state court will
not be redressed by the federal courts. Agg v. Flanagan, 855 F.2d
336, 339 (6th Cir. 1988). Because this complaint sought to
overturn state court decisions regarding the disposition of real
property, it was properly
No. 95-5904
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dismissed. We need not address whether the additional bases for
dismissal contested by the parties are applicable. The district
court order dismissing this cause of action is affirmed.
Rule
9(b)(3), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Clerk Leonard Green (signer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
FRANKFORT AT FRANKFORT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 95-33
ROBERT HEDGES, PLAINTIFF,
V. ORDER
JANET L. STUMBO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
* * * * * *
The plaintiff having filed an amended complaint adding new
parties [Record No. 6], and being advised, IT IS ORDERED that the
complaint as amended be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED for
the reasons set forth in the Order dated and filed June 5, 1995.
The so-called "Rooker Feldman" doctrine precludes this Court
from entertaining an action which is nothing more than a thinly
to secure federal review of a final decision of the highest
court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
This the 3 day of August, 1995.
JOSEPH M. HOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
FRANKFORT CIVIL ACTION NO. 95-33
ROBERT H. HEDGES, PLAINTIFF, V.
O R D E R
HON. JANET L. STUMBO, et al., DEFENDANTS.
* * * * * *
The Court is in receipt of the motion of the plaintiff to set
aside judgment, hold judgment in abeyance or extend time to file
a notice of appeal. [Record No. 17]. Following a motion by the
defendants to dismiss [Record No. 3], the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint [Record No. 6]. On June 5, 1995, the Court
granted the motion of the defendants to dismiss. [Record No. 7].
Contemporaneously, a judgment was entered in accordance with that
Order. [Record No. 8]. At that time, it was the intent of the
Court to dismiss the amended complaint. This was not, however,
clearly specified in the Order and Judgment. Subsequent to that
Order and Judgment, the defendants who had been added in the
amended complaint filed motions to dismiss. [Record Nos. 9, 11].
The plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal. [Record No. 14].
On August 24, 1995, the Court reiterated that the
"Rooker-Feldman" doctrine precludes this Court from entertaining
an action which is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to
secure federal review of a final decision of the highest court of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Based on l this rationale, the
Court dismissed the amended complaint. l [Record No. 16]. l
Although it is true that a notice of appeal generally deprives
the district court of jurisdiction of all matters forming the
basis of the appeal, [t]his rule . . . is neither a creature of
statute nor is it absolute in character." Island Creek Coal Sales
Co. v. City of Gainesville, 764 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1985). In
Island Creek, for example, the Court of Appeals held that the
district court had jurisdiction to supervise its judgment and
enforce its order through civil contempt proceedings. In the
instant matter, the plaintiff's filing of a notice of appeal was
premature in that the earlier Order of this Court did not clearly
specify that the amended complaint was dismissed as well. Thus
the notice of appeal does not ouster the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain motions filed after the Order of this Court
[Record No. 7] but before the notice of appeal [Record No. 14].
This situation closely
resembles that of Sine v. Local No. 992, Intern. Broth. of
Teamsters, 790 F.2d 1095, 1097 (4th Cir. 1986) ""Because the
filin of the notice of appeal was premature, our consideration of
any of the issues which might be raised by that notice must await
the filing of a proper notice of appeal after the district court
has considered the merits of the motions that were pending at the
time the plaintiffs filed their first [premature] notice."). The
general rule of jurisdiction is not intended to result in undue
paper shuffling. The amended complaint of the plaintiff has been
dismissed. The plaintiff is free to appeal this decision to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1) That the motion of the
plaintiff to set aside, hold judgment in abeyance, or extend
time to file notice of appeal [Record No. 17] be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED. (2) That this Order is FINAL AND
APPEALABLE and there is NO JUST CAUSE FOR DELAY.
This the day of September, 1995. .
JOSEPH M. HOOD,
JUDGE