CHAPTER 3D
Lawyers as Lobbyist
The "capture theory" of regulators lays out the thought that initially the regulator is a 'reformer", who as time passes is replaced by the representative of the regulated industry. Thus the agency is captured by it's own "ball players" (Stein 1955). Several studies determined that statistics from nine agencies did not indicate a recruitment pattern from the regulated industry. However, lawyers numerically dominated eight of the nine agencies. These lawyers tended to come from the less economically privileged strata of the profession, though a smaller percentage were exceptional students and career individuals. Kemp (1986)
Magee thinks lawyers:
• captured the political system over time.
• control laws and regulations in the present.
• are rent-seeking and frequently create parasitical litigation.
Epp (1992) said that lawyers have no common interest; are not organized to follow any particular interest; and do not act effectively to achieve any alleged interest. Rent-seeking among lawyers does not occur.
Lawyers would have a real stake in maintaining either a growing market for their services or a stable growth rate, slightly behind demand.
The question is : do they lobby to increase the demand ?
Lawyers dominate the legislative branches of our Federal government more extensively than any country. As of 1991, 61 percent of the U.S. Senate were lawyers and 42 percent of the House were lawyers. Lawyers exercised substantial influence in the legislative, judicial and through their lobbies, the executive branches of the U.S. government. (Chan Young-Lee 1997:15)
According to Magee (1993) the ABA and the American Trial Lawyers lobby the Congress and the state legislatures to expand complex laws, and complex regulations, which require the use of lawyers to bring more disputes into court. Important reforms to the legal system have been blocked by lawyer lobbies which have dominated many state legislatures. Lawyers are not limited just to challenging laws or defending their clients in the courtroom. They can also take their fight to the legislative and the executive branches where they can advocate regulations, laws and loopholes.
According to Olson (1982), long-stable societies tend to have more special interest lobbying, cartelization, and collusion than the societies with rapid change. The "good old boy networks" flourish.
Much special interest legislation, and some regulations, work contrary to economic efficiency and growth. There is lost consumer surplus under the regulations than would have resulted from an impartial treatment of different industries and sectors.