91-CI-0021 and Judge Hinton, defendant | Judge Field, defendant | The Kentucky Heritage Commission | The Kentucky Bar | Judge Lape, defendant | Judge Satterwhite | Judge Meade | The Wetzelberger cases | Judge Godby | A bad experience | A California jury | The Federal case | The District Court | The 6th Circuit | The 6th Circuit UPDATE | A land tort | US District Judge Hood | Circuit Judge Conliffe | Admin Judge Weir | Appeal Judge | The Respondents in the US Supreme Court |

Spencer Circuit 91-CI-0021 ) was not "heard". No hearing had been held in this case as of January 1995, even though it was filed in mid April 1991. Assigned Special Judge Richard Hinton lived 100 miles away, and stated that he "didn't know when [he] will get back over here". He was assigned to 91-CI-0021 in June 1991. Judge Richard Hinton was notified of my address after the partitioning ruling failed to reach me within 30 days, late in October until November 1991. He received seven letters from me regarding this case and the partitioning case. I believe that since a clerk cannot be held responsible for omissions or errors, that the judge must be the responsible individual. The judge had discussed this case with my opponent, Dale, by phone, but he failed to answer me. This judge issued a pair of notices that he would be in Spencer Co in five days, about March 1992. These notices were sent to the mail drop necessitated by the forcible detainer. I did not receive these notices in a timely manner, nor did they follow the CR5. which requires notice to the "last known address". The court failed to maintain jurisdiction over the parties by failing to follow the rules about notice. That makes any acts of the court on that date nullities, because notice is very basic to jurisdiction. The statute notice required to be given witnesses who may be called by subpoena is much longer than the two days which five-day notice to the mail drop would allow.

Dale, the opposing lawyer made a motion that the court summarily dismiss this case, soon after that void hearing date of Mar 1992. I asked the judge repeatedly about whether there had been any ruling on the summary judgment motion, in the correspondence which followed. He never responded. The court failed to notify me of the ruling and to this day I do not have a copy of that alleged summary judgment. It is not effective before it is served properly. Based upon the motion urging the application of summary judgment, the ruling violated Rule 8, which specifically excluded the grounds called upon by my opponent, res judicata, statute of frauds, etc. These are factually disputable issues which cannot be disposed of under the summary judgment rule. Also the pro se rules which are written by the Federal Circuits clearly state that summary judgment is not to be used against a pro se litigant without explanation by the court to the pro se litigant that the judgment may take the place of a trial. Judge Hinton never again returned to Spencer Co, nor did he ever contact me, despite several phone calls, and a personal visit to his office. He has not been sitting in the 19th Judicial Circuit for some time, and his runner-up in the previous election has been holding court there. The unsettled issues from Probate are unheard and unsettled.

Judge Hinton had (in the hallway, offhand) said " that there was no such thing as a quasi-contract" while he was in Spencer in late April 1991. He also said "I have enough trouble with attorneys, without having to bother with a pro se litigant." "Go get yourself a lawyer." I continued to file case law citations in my case, explaining facts and the applicable law, especially the law about contracts. (contracts implied in law, which agree with the doctrine of promissory estoppel)

The lawyer Dale later made a motion that the court give the defendant (Dale) injunctive relief to prevent further documents to be field in this large and still unheard case. This is a frivolous motion. It violated Rule 11. The issuing of an injunction requires a showing of a right to relief and proof of irreparable damage in the absence of the injunction. The court issued his urged order. This is a constitutional violation. The Spencer Court Clerk refused to file a Notice of Appeal in this case, over this order. If a court could enjoin further pleadings in a case, it could deny appeal, or the various motions allowable under Rules 52, 59, 60, 61, 65, etc. No right exists to enjoin filing of pleadings, and again a nullity has issued, based upon a frivolous motion by the attorney who planned to collect a percent of my heritage Hedges Farm, without regard for the law.

This case contains the claims against the real property which has been improved. The improvements include silvaculture (tree farming), land clearing, landscaping, road building, pond building and improving, frame construction, a new dwelling, concrete and stone work, roofing, and underground utilities, all on this farm by me. This case was filed less than 60 days after an auctioneer took bids on the 255 acres of the Hedges Farm which the Executors were empowered by will to sell. (the will did not specify a sale method, nor exclude the possibility of heirs making private bids or bid-ins, or buying first, so efforts to prevent me from owning would have been arbitrary and capricious.) The statute of limitations which apply to a claim upon real property (an in rem claim for improvements) is sixty days after a buyer "buys". A lien filed in the Circuit Court record is legal notice to all parties.

This case also contains the claims against the heirs as defendants, (in personnam), and includes the topics of tort for malicious prosecution and abuse of process arising from the forcible detainer, which was ended in Mar 1991, by Order from Judge Number 5, District Judge Field of Oldham Co's Court. This case contains the tort by Judge William Stewart who acted without jurisdiction in the District Court (which is a statute court) , in the forcible detainer case. The forcible detainer deprived me of a going-concern business, and ensured that I was not able to get credit to bid on my own land. This illegal judgment therefore was a contributing factor in the denial of my right to own some of the Hedges Farm.

This case contains the tort of waste in the surveying and tracting of the 355 acres, which led to bids being taken on larger tracts than the market would have allowed. I had this land platted in five acre tracts. Since it has 1 & 3/4 miles of road frontage, and has city water, it was/is a desirable place to build. The surveying plan adopted was a contributing factor in the denial of my right to own this property. The auctioneer who claimed to be the expert in the partitioning case has claimed in a response to my complaint to the Auctioneers Board that he merely filed the surveyors plan with Planning and Zoning, and does not have responsibility for the ultimate plan. He does admit that small tracks always sell for more per acre than large tracks. (presumably because more bidders can get small loans, and therefore more small purchasers will bid) More small tracts would have driven the prices up, and prevented four buyers from getting it all. The question of who urged the auction itself is still unknown, and will require questioning of witnesses, which has never happened in any of these cases yet.

The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that New KRS definining "fair market value". fair market value is determined by a buyer agrees to offer, and a seller agrees to accept, neither under compulsion to buy or sell. Auctions do not set fair market value. The setting of a time to sell regardless of who attends and regardless of what amount is bid is coercion. Whomever advised this method of sale deprived me of my fair market value for what was inevitably going to be sold, since four heirs only cared for money rather than wanting to save history. Every successful bid was an individual who had expressed interest in that land, and had a business nearby. The method of sale excluded all bidders who did not have an ongoing farming operation. No family member could buy because the auctioneer used a grouping method which allowed only the largest purchaser to buy, and so no small purchases were allowed. This is an issues which will be brought up in this case also, because whomever recommended the grouping method of sale deprived me of the right to buy.

This case contains the tort of the theft of the D-4 Cat Dozer (a partnership machine). This case contains the tort of the taking of the construction materials (culverts, lumber, stone, supplies, missing personal property, furniture, tools, equipment) belonging to me (RH9) and taken by individuals who may need to be identified in the court. This case contains any other issues which are disputed in Probate, whatever they may be. These issues are jury trial issues, with a jury to act as a fact-finder.

The Defendant's council was served with a copy of the case immediately after the Circuit Court Clerk assigned a case number to the case. Individual defendants received a copy, (although there was an effort to refuse service, by refusing to receive certified mail, or by moving and failing to leave a forwarding address.

The defendant Dale either contested the factual statements alleged by the plaintiff, me, (RH9) or they did not. If the factual allegations were contested, then, the court and the jury must act as a fact-finder to determine what the facts are. Facts well-pled by plaintiff, and nowhere denied by defendant are accepted as true. Only facts which are disputed require the court's time for determination. A KY rule says that disputing a truthful fact can result in a fee assessment for the cost of proving that fact.

A Rule 60 Motion and much case law is filed in this case, and has been pending for about a year. No judge is sitting.

The Kentucky Heritage Commission seems to be mostly concerned with how much Federal money it can get to save (pet projects) antiquities, rather than helping to prevent the irreparable loss of an old family farm (not involving state funds), which has original family owners capable and dedicated to its preservation waiting for justice and honesty. By coincidence, KY advertises historic sites with 53% of the publicity photos in the state tourism guide.

Judge Julia Field, now a defendant in my Federal case, was assigned to replace the 53rd District Judge, who recused after allowing a hearing in the Forcible Detainer action, almost a year after I (RH9) was held in contempt for not removing himself from the real property which I had inherited, and had never had exclusive use and possession of nor signed any lease to rent. (exclusive possession & signed lease are KRS 383 requirements to apply the Forcible Detainer statute, without regard for the unconstitutionality of applying this type statute to an owner.) The abuse of process which resulted from a hearing a year later, which lacked testimony of any sort, and was an harassment tactic by the influence-peddling-opposing lawyer was the last hearing which the District/Probate Judge set in.(yes probate was also going on in the same District court, side by side with the forcible detainer.) The new Probate Judge did not require any sworn testimony; she did not allow questioning by RH9, or require the opposing council to have accurate facts to present to the court. RH9 had been denied any opportunity to cross-examine the opposition regarding irregularities and incomplete probate records; a missing safety deposit box and the documents contained therein; an automobile which was inventoried, "TAXED, allegedly given to RH9, and still seems to be nonexistent; a truck which is stolen from RH9 and still LEGALLY TITLED to me (RH9); and 105 ft of 5.5 ft steel-reinforced- concrete culvert pipe which was to be installed along 1/2 mile of state highway for easy access to about 100 ( part of the 255 acres) acres, thereby raising its value appreciably as developed residential real estate.

I had these materials and many others on the job-site when the Court misused the Forcible Detainer to remove RH9 from his property/ land development/farm. This reduced the value of the 355 acres, as did the failure to take bids on 5 acre tracts rather than on 26 and 78 acre tracts, comprising this 100 acre area. Judge Field, Oldham District, Ky, has failed to respond to me (RH9) regarding the Motion under Rule 60 over the fee allowed in that Court against me (RH9) for the forcible detainer, as well as over several other irregularities. Judge Field is ignoring me (RH9). The safety deposit box is by statute under penalty to be inventoried, and it has yet to be located. There is an effort to deny the existence of this safety deposit box.

Other Judges are minor bit players similar to all those Policeman who stood around while the two convicted Police officers beat Rodney King.

The American Bar Association has a credo that "it is the appearance of impropriety which defines what is not to be done." This situation has every appearance of impropriety. The US Supreme Court has stated that denials of constitutional rights may be publicized if given accurate press coverage. Therefore the law cannot prevent the publicizing of the wrongdoing described in this book.
The events described herein are less immediately physically threatening, of course, but similar to the several police officers who were present and saw the Rodney King beating, but were not convicted of actually participating.

Judge Lape is the Administrator of the Circuit, and a Circuit Judge in Kenton Co (recently retired). KY, which is a four-Circuit county. He has been notified by pleadings of this series of nullities, and the violations of Rule 11 by the attorney who has apparently been paid both a percent of this estate and fees for this frivolous, wasteful and fraudulent mess. He has failed to respond to me. Thus meaningful access to the court is denied by inaction. He became a defendant in the Federal case, before the facts were pled by the orignial plaintiff judges, which would implicate him.

Judge C Satterwhite (Carrol, Grant, Owen Counties KY), has been assigned as a Circuit Judge to hear an appeal of Judge Field's Probate ruling which takes a fee from me and gave a fee to the lawyer (SP); and fails to state how the 20 odd exceptions raised in Probate by me were settled. The issues raised in probate include questions about items inventoried, lost, taken, sold, wasted, etc. Judge Satterwhite failed to set aside the void fee ruling over the forcible detainer, which is included in her ruling. He has also been apprised of the nullities in each case, and the Rule 11 violations, but has not been assigned to any other part of this very large matter. He is not named as a defendant in Federal Court.

I sought the removal of the injunctive relief in 91-CI-0021, (which is the very large case in which I am plaintiff- see Part 6) which had prevented me from filing a Notice of Appeal. I approached, the Jefferson Circuit, (16 Judges); the Franklin Co Circuit, (2 Judges); and the Fayette Circuit (6 Judges).I was not denied the dissolving of the unconstitutional injunction but I was denied a hearing under Rule 65 by each of these circuit. Rule 65 clearly says that any judge can remove or instigate injunctive relief, when the judge is not sitting or available in the circuit, as is the case herein. The (now retired) Chief Judge (N.M. Meade) in Fayette stated by phone " I tell my judges not to look over the work of others." He suggested that a new case in the Court of Appeals for a Writ of Mandamus would be correct. The US Supreme Court said "a person applying for a writ mandamus must be without any other legal remedy" I believe that the Writs are for extraordinary relief only, and since the best authorities on the Court of Appeals all agree that every event which can be carried out at the trial level is to be done below, I must disagree with the attitude of the senior Circuit that the Court of Appeals alone should correct a trial court. This would be more vexation toward me. Rule 65 clearly makes the same case in the trial court level the proper place to remove (or place) injunction.

There was a small case along the way where a brother-in-law (CFW) took me to court to recover a small amount of money which borrowed (I did not ask him for a loan, but rather he volunteered), from him. I invested those funds in the farm, (in the D-4 Cat dozer repair, a 3/4 ton 4 wheel drive truck-repair, and large culverts) and had not been paid by the estate, so I did not pay him. The District court under Judge William Stewart ruled against me, the Circuit under Judge Richard Hinton ruled against me on appeal, and then he went to Small Claims Court in Jefferson Co to collect the small debt. I did not want to pay him until I was paid, and along the way my collateral/ property had disappeared. My furniture, my D-4 Cat Dozer, my big loud 76 GMC 4 wheel drive truck, my culverts, etc. were missing,and I did not see how I could justify payment without knowing where my property was and when it would be returned. A Jefferson District Judge Whittingham gave him a garnishment, in District Court, and laughed " you lost" when I asked for the issues to be clarified. She also said "I'm so tired of hearing about that bulldozer" when I was in her court for the VERY FIRST TIME. I made a Rule 52 Motion in this case, (small claims court technically does not apply any rules except as noted in the creating statute) so that the issues would be clarified, and Judge Whittingham retaliated against me by increasing the judgment by 50% against me. She did not however, clarify the issues as Rule 52 requires. She wrote several very prejudicial and unnecessary nasty things into this judgment. I appealed this judgment to the Circuit, and it was affirmed. The appeal process appears to be a mere rubber stamp based on my experiences. You should read that case. I will include it in my book. My property is still missing and presumed stolen. I have not been able to get anyone to do anything about the thefts of my personal property.

I complained to the Auctioneers Board about a violation of KRS 330. I had to support my opinion with many case law citations. The auctioneer answered with conclusory statements, which reflects his belief and opinion only. Judge SR Godby, who retired and made way for Judge Hinton, is the mediator of or has some similar task in the Auctioneers Complaint Board, and he has dismissed my complaint without prejudice, stating that it fails to state a prima facie case. The auctioneer was not required to answer my complaint in a factual way. The auctioneers find this business quite lucrative you know. They receive a percentage of an entire farm for very little work. Compare the good-faith labors of a son over twenty years, and the 7% given a stranger for a single Saturday afternoon.

I once had a lawyer (a random stranger from Lawyer Referral) on retainer,(1980) and suddenly was faced with no future cash flow and a need for civil legal relief. I asked this lawyer to collect two small amounts, based on a breached and incompleted contract ($11,136.00) and a "strollin pettifogger has been doing all along.

A jury tried to tell me (then in 1981) that I had no contract. A California jury told Kim Basinger that she owed $7 million to someone who claimed they were damaged because her star- appeal-bankable-credit was not available to them if she declined to star in their movie. I had years of work completed; joint-loans and joint-banking; an income tax method of partnership (which is legally always based upon agreement-contract); and new agreements each and every working day . . . and a jury tried to tell me that I had no contract. We will examine the signed documents better this time.

A Federal case has been filed against the judges listed in this article. The Defendants/Respondents are listed in this document.